by making best sense of an existing legal practice, we may still conclude that the practice failed the ideal. Take the fugitive slave Acts for instance.  What should the judges do when they are legally required to send captured slaves back to the South? In order to maintain the integrity of legal system, the judges should send those slaves back but to achieve the goal of justice, judges should set the slaves free. Hence, the outcome of the judgment represents a serious conflict between integrity and jusitice. A positivist will deal this case by distinguishing legal justice and real justice, but in Dworkin’s theory, this is criticized. According to Dworkin’s theory, the relevant ideal here is the ideal of integrity; it is through bad legal argument that one fails to meet that ideal, and it is bad because it hasn’t made maximal use, in the circumstances of actual practice, what that actual ideal of integrity requires. So interpretivism produces an ideal, but it is not the outcome that would be the best in all possible worlds, which is how we ordinarily think of ideals. But maybe this doesn’t particularly matter. We have the ideal solution in integrity and this differs from the ideal solution in justice. At times both fairness and efficiency require following precedents, but integrity is different, although it will serve both those values as well. Nevertheless, the ideal of integrity appears to be constrained by existing practices in a way that the ideal of justice is not. Or, by its nature, it seems, interpretation is only possible within the existing world, which suggests it is not an ideal at all. A cruder way of putting this point is that ‘making the best sense of’ existing legal practices is no more than adequately characterizing equity deficits, that is to say characterizing how far these practices fall short of the ideal.