The Washington Consensus was enforced heavily in many countries in Latin America in the 1990s, in an American led effort to boost the economies to their south. In Mexico in particular, it was seen as the road to Mexican economic salvation – the way to escape “bad economic policy easily overcome by better adherence to neoclassical economic doctrines” (Cypher, 1998: 48). Because Chile had employed the policies advocated by the holders of the Consensus, it had been seen as a sign that any country which implemented them properly would of course see great things happen to them – the idea that Chile had been the exception, or had succeeded in spite rather than because of those policies appeared never to occur to them. Mexico perhaps had the misfortune to attempt to implement the policies at the same time as the Asian economic crisis was reducing the will to invest in Latin America, but the fact cannot be avoided that for all the de-regulation and market liberalisation that occurred, the little foreign capital that came into the economy was typically not due to their new market position, and altogether, this barely hid a yawning trade deficit which could not possibly be sustained for long; typical of Washington Consensus developing economies, despite moderate economic growth of around 5%, wages fell by a third in a three year period (Cypher, 1998: 48). Whatever this did for the economy as a whole, it was never going to win the Consensus, and the package of policies that it required to be implemented in order to be fun, any friends among the Mexican people who were finding that they were poorer as a result of implementing it, with no obvious gain to anyone except the rich foreign investors. Although foreign investment in Mexico did reach $50bn in 1997, this was a peak rather than a plateau, and not something from which the Mexican people, the Mexican economy, nor Mexico would benefit from in the long run.