理解这种领导学说的思想是任何学说与设备讨论的核心。作为两个非常不同的思想，正如米迦勒少校所说的那样，军事机构明白，虽然每个人都与另一个有关系，但这种程度在很大程度上是不同的。当一个人检查某些军事活动或操作，这种程度的差异变得更加明显。这些战役虽然成功在一般意义上不会被认为是成功的，因为所使用的设备，但由于教义（和隐含的领导），他们受雇于战场上。这是更明显的情况下，质量和/或数量的设备劣于对手。在这种情况下，良好的学说和领导能力是胜利的关键。在现代军事史上的1939后不能有一个更加完善的原则和领导工作的范例在军事行动中比在规划和执行操作霸王和随后的盟军入侵欧洲在1944夏天。充分理解的程度，这取决于判断和两栖作战领导完美的网格与整体主义，必须认识到巨大的劣势，盟军与德军在男人和在攻击点材料。根据它的定义，两栖攻击带来的风险和许多障碍，无论多少人和设备的操作需要。美国历史学家Stephen Ambrose指出“两栖作战本质上是最复杂的战争中，很少有人是成功的”，只有Julius Caesar和征服者威廉在历史上曾经成功进行了一次两栖登陆。[ 2 ]，但在这个特殊的两栖作战，在历史上的范围和规模，是无与伦比的，困难是由事实上的复合，盟军严重寡不敌众的人也拥有显著的优势的时候，装备的敌人。
Understanding this idea of leadership/doctrine is central to any discussion of doctrine versus equipment. Being two very distinct ideas, as Major Michael states above, the military establishment understands that while each has a relationship to the other, the degree to which this is true varies a great deal. When one examines certain military campaigns or operations, this degree of variance becomes more visible. These campaigns of note albeit successful in a general sense would not be deemed successful because of the equipment used, but because of the doctrine (and the implied leadership) by which they were employed on the battlefield. This is even more apparent in cases where the quality and/or quantity of equipment are inferior in relation to the opponent. In these instances, good doctrine and strength of leadership is imperative for victory. In the annals of modern military history after 1939 there cannot be a more perfect example of doctrine and leadership at work in a military operation than was present in the planning and execution of Operation OVERLORD and the subsequent Allied invasion of Europe in the summer of 1944.To fully appreciate the degree to which this amphibious operation depended on judgment and leadership to mesh perfectly with an overall doctrine, one must be cognizant of the monumental disadvantage the Allies were versus the Germans in terms of men and material at the point of attack. By its very definition, an amphibious attack comes with risks and numerous hurdles no matter how much men and equipment the operation entails. American historian Stephen Ambrose points out that “amphibious operations are inherently the most complicated in war and few have ever been successful” and only Julius Caesar and William the Conqueror to that point in history had ever successfully carried out an amphibious landing. But in this particular amphibious operation, the scope and size of which were unparalleled in history, the difficulties were compounded by the fact that on the ground, the Allies were badly outnumbered by an enemy who also held a distinct advantage when it came to equipment.